NBER Working Paper #530 August, 1980 Does Daniel Feenberg "[the deduction of interesti permits the taxpayer to make loans for the purchase of wholly exempt securities and then deduct the interest paid on such loans from his otherwise taxable income, thereby reducing the tax." --A Senate report of 19181 Miller and Scholes (1918) propose the following strong dividend invariance proposition: "Given the firm's investment decision, the firm's dividend decision will have no effect on the wealth or economic welfare of its [rationall shareholders." This stands in sharp contrast to the conventional view that taxable shareholders will prefer capital gains to dividends both because capital gains are taxed at a lower rate and because taxation of such gains is deferred until realization. This note begins with a short restatement of the conditions necessary for dividend invariance to hold, and concludes with a measurement made from a large sample of the U.S. tax returns of the extent to which these conditions hold. It is shown that the special circumstances under which Miller and Scholes' hypothesis can occur are so rare that no role may logically be ascribed to the hypothesis in the determination of corporate dividend policy.
Conventional finanical wisdom suggests that individual shareholders could have saved half or more of the over eight billion dollars in taxes paid on twenty-six billion dollars in dividend income reported on their 1911 individual income tax returns. This would require only that firms make more extensive use of well known techniques for converting dividends to capital gains.
Miller and Scholes present a clever explanation for this seemingly irrational behavior of firms. They suggest that earlier authors have not read the tax code carefully, and that the rational, wealth-maximizing taxpayershareholder will actually pay a lower rate of tax on dividends than on capital gains. This surprising outcome is the result of the interaction of a time honored tax dodge --borrowing to finance tax favored investment --and a little known section of the current tax law which regulates that practice. In essence,
Miller and Scholes propose that for each dollar of dividend income that shareholders receive they should borrow a sufficient sum of money to produce a one dollar interest expense deduction. If the loan proceeds are invested in a single payment annuity or some other tax favored security a net reduction in taxable income is achieved.2 Furthermore, if the altered cash flow presents a problem for the taxpayer, it may be possible to borrow against the increasing cash value of the annuity to finance the interest payments due on the loan. By this strategy, which Miller and Scholes dub "dividend laundering" it is possible to build a portfolio with the risk-return structure of the stock, but with the tax deferral advantage of the annuity.3 In an optimal portfolio enough income would be sheltered in this fashion to bring the taxpayer's current bracket rate on ordinary income down to the effective bracket rate on capital gains. Because this strategy minimizes taxes without changing the risk-return structure of the portfolio, it dominates any portfolio with a lesser amount of debt.
Absent any other consideration this arbitrage opportunity would not explain the existence of dividends, because capital gains could be sheltered through the same mechanism. Indeed, because of the sixty percent capital gains exclusion, the distribution of profits as capital gains would economize on the possibly costly tax shelter. The hypothesized preference for dividends is a consequence of Section 163(d) of the Internal Revenue Code, the investment interest limitation.
That regulation effectively limits the deduction of interest paid to mortgage payments plus dividend and interest income plus 10,000 dollars.5
The intent of this rule was to allow deductions for interest paid on mortgages and loans used to purchase assets producing taxable income and to disallow the deduction if the proceeds of the loan are invested in a tax favored device. Actually, any amount of interest or dividend income may be sheltered with this device but the regulation does restrict the ability of taxpayers to shelter labor income from taxation and it introduces an additional distinction between the taxation of dividends and that of capital gains. For the taxpayer constrained by this section marginal capital gains are taxed at the regular capital gains rate but each additional dollar of dividend income would allow the taxpayer to increase his borrowing sufficiently to wipe out the additional tax liability. Such taxpayers may be expected to prefer firms to pay out profits as dividends rather than convert those profits to capital gains. Simply put, increased dividends allow the dollars and one tenth of all other returns.
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In Table one Because the constraint implicit in section 163(d) is not binding for any significant fraction of taxpayers, or for taxpayers receiving any significant fraction of dividend income, it is impossible to ascribe to that section any significant role in the determination of corporate dividend policy. (345, 398) 15,000-20,000 11,553,600 5,1473,520 3,195,6140 31,360 329 i,686,6ii (1)43,505) (128,560) (16,316) (2, 1814) (2614, 625) 20,000-50,000 17, 5145, 1430 8,509,820 2There is an alternative simpler strategy not mentioned by Miller and Scholes.
The taxpayer could sell his stock and purchase an insurance policy with the same risk and return as the stock. We know that the insurance company could offer such a policy; it need only add the relevant stock to its portfolio to be perfectly hedged. The more complicated procedure does manage to avoid a capital gains realization. The point to remember is that the borrowing and lending doesn't create any new tax shelters, it simply alters the rewards of those which already exist. 3or fairly detailed, but hardly conclusive views of the legality of this procedure, the reader is referred to Klein (1962) and Asiniov (1977) . In principle the interest deduction may be disallowed if the combination of loan and tax shelter has no significant beneficial function other than the reduction of taxes. In practice the IRS is likely to disallow the deduction if the only security for the loan is the cash value of the shelter. For the taxpayer with a small enough spread between his borrowing and lending rate this need not be a serious obstacle, since some other collateral may be used.
Details of Section 163(d) are in Bierman and Stechel (1977) . 5Briefly, the investment interest deduction is the interest deduction less the home mortgage deduction. 61f the realization of the capital gain can be deferred indefinitely then it is effectively tax-free and taxpayers should display complete indifference between dividends and unrealized capital gains.
